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Thinking Rather than Panicking about the Current Drone Threat 
Drones pose a number of threats to venues with large crowds.  To better prepare and 
respond to these threats, the problems drones may cause should be broken down to allow 
different actors with different interests to develop different strategies for dealing with these 
threats.  To maximize efficiency and effectiveness, the variety of strategies should be 
complementary and synergistic.  This document seeks to establish different strategies for the 
interested parties and provide some insight for how to formulate and operationalize counter-
drone strategies. 
Before delving into what should be done, it is important to consider first the desired 
outcomes for those involved.  With respect to large venues and the organizations that depend on 
them, the goal of a counter-drone strategy is to stop or mitigate the use of drones that could 
unintentionally damage infrastructure or harm spectators/participants.  Those involved should 
focus on stopping those that could unintentionally cause harm based on the logic that it is the 
most likely threat.  Focusing on the most dangerous threat for sport or entertainment venues 
enters a realm where the costs of pursuing such a strategy far exceed the capabilities of those 
involved and does not match the benefits gained.  Ultimately, the goal of a counter-drone 
program is ensure that sport and entertainment venues appear safe enough to encourage people to 
return after an event occurs.  Trying to prevent those with the intention to cause damage or harm 
simply falls outside the scope of those responsible only for venue security and must remain 
within the domain of those responsible for law enforcement and counter-terrorism operations. 
For law enforcement and counter-terrorism agencies, the goal is to prevent or mitigate the 
effects of drones when intentionally used to create damage or harm; these agencies must focus 
on both the most likely and the most dangerous threats.  Law enforcement and counter-terrorism 
agencies must also balance their activities to cover both possibilities and consider far more 
complex scenarios to avoid becoming overly focused on one possibility and getting blind-sided 
by another.  For example, a terrorist network that wishes to target a large venue could 
realistically use drones as a diversion for a much larger attack.  As another example, drones 
could just be one part of a complex operation, such as providing surveillance for a group of 
operatives attempting to conduct an act of terror.  
   Thinking Rather than Panicking      3 
 
3 
 
It is important to note that there are two desired goals surrounding venue security: 1) 
stopping the use of drones before they cause damage or harm, and 2) mitigating the effects 
should a drone cause, or threaten to cause, damage or harm.  Most importantly, venue security 
must balance their efforts to ensure they do not appear too lax or too restrictive/paranoid.  A 
guiding question for all operations should be “Will people feel comfortable bringing loved ones 
to the venue?”  If an incident occurs and the response is perceived as efficient and effective, 
people will likely remain willing to attend future events.  Operations designed to create effective 
and efficient responses to unintentional acts will also serve well should an intentional attack 
occur.  This is where venue security can create a necessary synergy with law enforcement and 
counter-terrorism operations designed to mitigate the effects of an intentional attack. 
Risk Assessment 
Risk is the most important consideration when deciding how best to manage the problem of 
drones at public events. Careful consideration of the threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood of 
occurrence, and consequence will result in better decisions regarding risk management strategies. 
The best risk management strategies are cost-effective, feasible, and reasonable. There are four 
risk management strategies: 1  
1. Risk Avoidance – Eliminating risk by cancelling an event 
2. Risk Control – Implementing measures to reduce the likelihood or consequences of 
an incident 
3. Risk Acceptance – A decision not to implement countermeasures because of low 
likelihood or the cost of the countermeasures exceeding the benefits derived from 
those countermeasures. 
4. Risk Transfer – Shifting some or all of the risk to another entity (e.g., insurance) 
Risk avoidance is an extreme risk management strategy that will only be justified in the presence 
of extreme risk. At this time, given the size, range, and payload capacity of civilian drones risk 
avoidance should only be considered when there is specific, credible intelligence that an attacker 
                                                           
1. Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine,  (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011), 23. 
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intends to use a drone to deliver a nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological payload capable 
of causing mass casualties and has the ability to do so. Mere desire is insufficient to justify risk 
avoidance or implementation of extreme countermeasures. Risk control will be the most 
common risk management strategy to address the risk drones pose to public events. 
Threat assessment is the first step in the risk assessment process. Considering drone use at a 
public event as single threat will lead to inefficient, ineffective, and wasteful use of security 
resources. The threat is the operator of a drone, not the drone itself. A potential drone operator’s 
skill level, intent, motivation, and incentive to fly a drone over a large outdoor venue will 
influence risk as well as the selection of appropriate countermeasures. Categorizing drone 
operators by intent is critical to choosing appropriate and cost-effective countermeasures. The 
two threat categories for drone operators are malicious and non-malicious. 
Malicious Drone Operators 
Malicious drone operators intend to use a drone to kill, injure, or frighten people or to disrupt the 
event. They will be politically, religiously, or ideologically motivated. These operators pose the 
greatest threat, but are the least likely to materialize since there are much easier, reliable, and 
effective means of achieving these goals. Shooting into a crowd queuing at the entrance to a 
venue is easier and will likely cause more casualties and chaos than a small quad copter with a 
three to five pound explosive device payload. Fragmentation injuries are the most common cause 
of injury and death in open-space explosions.2 To maximize the number of casualties, an attacker 
would need to add shrapnel to the device requiring a compensatory reduction in explosive weight 
used in the device because of drone payload limitations.3 In addition, the attacker would have to 
maintain visual observation of the drone or mount a camera on the drone in order to fly it to the 
target. Direct visual observation will require the attacker to be inside the venue. Banning drones 
within the venue and screening attendee at venue entry points will eliminate this threat. Flying a 
drone into the venue, or “into the bowl,” from outside the stadium will require the drone to carry 
a camera, requiring further reduction in the weight of the explosive device. Furthermore, it is 
possible to eliminate the risk of a drone flying into a retractable dome stadium by closing the 
                                                           
2. Sidney B. Brevard, Howard Champion, and Dean Katz, "Weapons Effects: Chapter 2," 57. 
3. Ibid., 56. 
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dome. These technical limitations reduce the viability of using current civilian drone technology 
as an effective weapon delivery system.4 
Malicious drone operators will be difficult to deter, and risk control efforts for this threat should 
focus on quickly and efficiently responding to the incident, treating the injured, and crowd 
control. How the event organizer and first responders handle such an incident will have a great 
impact on public perceptions of safety at large outdoor events. 
Developing technologies to counter or shoot down a small drone may have unintended 
consequences that are as bad as, or worse than, the consequences of a small drone attack. 
Jamming radio frequencies to interfere with an operator’s ability to control the drone would 
require FCC approval and may interfere with the public’s ability to use their cellular phones. 
This could prevent attendees from calling for help or to report suspicious activity.5 Since 71 
percent of 911 calls are placed from cellular phones,6 the consequences of jamming activity that 
impairs the public’s ability to request emergency assistance may exceed, or add to, the 
consequences of a small drone terror attack. Public backlash over having their phones jammed 
and First Amendment litigation may also arise because of jamming. 
Shooting a drone down or hacking its radio link to assume control of the aircraft also poses 
problems. First, in the case of a shoot-down, debris or errant bullets may hit innocent parties on 
the ground. Hacking into the drone to take control may likely shift legal liability onto security 
personnel should the drone crash into the crowd and cause injures.  
Non-malicious Drone Operators 
Non-malicious operators are hobbyists, photographers, videographers, or fans who do not intend 
to cause harm or disruption and are using a drone to take photographs or record video of the 
event from a unique angle or perspective. These operators pose a lesser threat, but are the most 
likely to materialize. The primary threat posed by non-malicious drone operators is spectator 
                                                           
4. While these factors may reduce the risk of a drone attack on a crowd to cause mass casualties they do not reduce 
the risk of a drone being used for a targeted assignation of a high profile individual. See 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qKV6g47hgRs 
5. Federal Communications Commission, "Enforcement Advisory No. 2011-04,"  
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-11-250A1.pdf. 
6. "Guide: 911 Wireless Services,"  http://www.fcc.gov/guides/wireless-911-services. 
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injury caused by an unintentional crash of the drone. The consequences of such a crash are likely 
to be minor. For example, a drone crash into crowded stands at Virginia Motorsports Park caused 
“very minor” injuries to five people.7 
While the injuries sustained by spectators at the Virginia Motorsports Park were minor, the 
potential for spectator injury is of significant concern, especially for event organizers. Public 
perception of drone crash incidents at outdoor venues may eventually result in lower attendance 
if people fear they cannot attend a ballgame, race, or other large outdoor event without the risk of 
drone hitting them. Thus for both safety and business reasons, strategies must be developed to 
address the problem of non-malicious drone operators. Reducing or eliminating the number of 
non-malicious drone incidents will make malicious drones more obvious and easier for security 
personnel to identify imminent threats. 
Strategy and Operations to Prevent or Mitigate Unintentional Damage or Harm  
Two particular strategies should guide security operations: deterrence and compellence.  
The predominant strategy is deterrence.  Deterrence guides operations that will keep drone 
hobbyists from unintentionally creating a dangerous situation.  Several different actions will 
support the deterrence strategy.  First and foremost, venue security should partner with local law 
enforcement and other involved agencies—primarily the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA)—to educate the public about the dangers and penalties associated with using drones in the 
vicinity of large venues.   
At this time, non-malicious drone operators pose the greatest risk to large outdoor public events 
because of the likelihood they will materialize and the increasing frequency of non-malicious 
drone flights over public venues. Since this group of operators is motivated by personal or 
commercial gain, deterrence will be an effective preventative measure. Criminal and civil 
prosecutions will be powerful deterrents if the penalty (cost) exceeds the gain (benefit) to the 
non-malicious drone operator. Federal, state, and local statutes and ordinances should be created 
to impose stiff financial penalties and possible incarceration for flying a drone over a crowd of 
people. Any state or local law should supplement federal regulations. All local statutes, 
                                                           
7. Martin Weil, "Drone Crashes into Virginia Bull Run Crowd,"  http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/drone-
crashes-into-virginia-bull-run-crowd/2013/08/26/424e0b9e-0e00-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html. 
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ordinances, or regulations must be written to allow drone use at public events with 
preauthorization from the event organizers and the FAA. 
The process of educating the public should focus both on deterring hobbyists from 
engaging in dangerous activities and informing/incentivizing the public to aid in preventing or 
mitigating such activities.  For example, a venue can post physical signs in areas most conducive 
to launching and recovering drones that forbid the operation of drones; those same signs can also 
provide information on how to notify authorities that illicit activities are occurring.  As an 
additional incentive, venues could offer small rewards, such as free admission for a future event, 
to further incentivize people to take the time to alert authorities.   
To be more effective, education should include how current civil and criminal laws affect 
drone operations.  Deterrence of non-malicious drone operators will be most effective if 
irresponsible drone operators are caught while flying the drone, are immediately cited or 
arrested, and quickly prosecuted. Local law enforcement is better able to prosecute these types of 
cases quickly than the FAA because of the availability of resources. 
A second facet of education involves the use of social media.  Those responsible for 
managing venues, as well as those that use them, could engage in open source intelligence to 
gauge the level of drone activity and to find the websites or applications that are most used to 
post information about drone activity.  These websites should then be used to educate people 
about the risks inherent in operating drones in the vicinity of large gatherings.  For example, a 
video could be posted to any website or app specifically designed to show pictures or videos 
(e.g., YouTube, Instagram, Facebook) of the drone crash that injured five people in a crowd at an 
event in 2013 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=law1SsMtg_g).  To make these posts more of 
a deterrent, the video should include information about the civil and criminal charges levied 
against the operator.  In addition, the key words posted with such a video should specifically 
include “drone” and “DIY.”  Another opportunity for education using social media is to put 
advertisements on Amazon or other web-based retail sites that provide warnings about the risks 
involved with operating drones (a term that should include any type of remotely controlled 
aircraft). 
A third facet that can augment education and contribute to overall deterrence is to map 
out likely areas for launch, recovery, and operation.  Maps should include overlays of different 
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potential operating ranges and limitations.  For example, ranges based on battery life, fuel 
capacity, and speed could be combined with line-of-site restrictions and, if warranted, an electro-
magnetic spectrum assessment.  Although this type of information would most likely come from 
either law enforcement or counter-terrorism agencies, there are other potential sources such as 
universities with classes that specialize in physical security.  Such a map with the overlays 
described could be done well in advance and should indicate the most likely areas for drone 
operation.  To expand awareness and education, signs should be posted at these locations to 
clearly explain the violations and penalties associated with the illicit use of drones.  Further, the 
signs should provide details on how to report such activity and indicate that potential rewards are 
available.  Lastly, it is important that these maps be updated regularly to include changes in the 
surrounding environment.   
The second strategy focuses on compellence.  Under normal conditions when threat 
assessments indicate low risk for terrorist activities, venues and law enforcement can rely on the 
public to report suspicious drone activities.  Under periods of higher threat, such as a particularly 
popular event (NFL Super Bowl, MLB All-Star Game, post-season events, etc.), law 
enforcement or venue security teams can post trained individuals in the likely areas for drone 
launch and recovery operations.  If a person is found conducting illicit, but not nefarious, drone 
flights, then security or law enforcement personnel should be trained how to facilitate the 
recovery of the drone without causing further danger.   
Strategy and Operations to Prevent or Mitigate Intentional Efforts to Cause Damage or 
Harm  
Although law enforcement and intelligence agencies provide the largest efforts to prevent 
or mitigate terrorist activities, venues and the organizations that rely on them can augment those 
efforts using a two-pronged deterrent strategy.  The first focuses on response.  If venue security 
incorporates robust response measures, then that particular venue will not appear as soft of a 
target.  Venues are typically viewed as a soft target, meaning that it is not too difficult to bypass 
security to conduct an attack.  Even more desirable, large venues make it easier to avoid 
detection.  Therefore, response must include two different aspects: response after an attack has 
occurred and response after a drone has been detected.  If post-attack response measures can 
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prevent mass panic and create the perception of order and control, then the target will not appear 
as worthwhile.  
Creating and exercising post-attack response measures poses a significant challenge; it is 
difficult to train venue security personnel for a real event, mostly because simulations would 
require significant expense.  One way to overcome this challenge is for venues to offer a reduced 
price or free admission for a particular section of the venue that will take part in a post-attack 
response exercise during pre-event activities. 
Developing and practicing responses to detected or reported drones are easier.  Venue 
security can partner with local law enforcement to create simulations that involve a real drone 
operator.  This type of activity enables security teams to test and exercise reporting procedures 
and determine if signs and incentives sufficiently motivate the public to get involved in venue 
security (reporters should be rewarded for their efforts, even during simulations).  Response 
times, engagement protocols, and passive and active detection measures can all be evaluated, 
debriefed, and improved. 
The second prong of this particular deterrent strategy is to create random anti-drone 
measures.  The nature of such measures will depend on the surrounding conditions and 
infrastructure.  One example would be for a venue to close its retractable roof during fair weather 
conditions.  A second example would be for a venue to announce the deployment of drone 
detection equipment.  Although such equipment is currently expensive and subject to limited 
availability, decoys could be used in the meantime to bolster the deterrent.  Looking more long-
term, venues or organizations could partner with, or create incentives for, outside entities to 
facilitate the development of such technology. 
Although the current status and proliferation of drones do not yet warrant significant 
concern, those charged with protecting the public should begin to shape policy and behavior 
now.  The rate at which people are purchasing drones and the rapid advancement of technology 
that make drones easier to operate and more capable will offer hobbyists and potential criminals 
or terrorists with options that are not currently available.  Making sure law enforcement, the 
intelligence community, and those with significant stakes in large venue security are not caught 
unaware will reduce the potential for serious harm. 
